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We use the 2003 Consumer Expenditure Survey and emissions estimates from an input-output model
to estimate the incidence of a price on carbon induced by a cap-and-trade program or carbon tax in
the US context. We present results on how much difference income deciles pay for a carbon tax as
well as which industries see the largest increase in costs due to a carbon tax.  We illustrate the main
determinant of the regressivity: consumption patterns for energy-intensive goods. We find that a policy
targeting CO2 from energy consumption is more regressive than a price on all emissions. Furthermore,
on a per-capita basis a carbon price is much more regressive than calculations at the household level.
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I.  Background 
 
There are currently several proposals being considered in the U.S. Congress for a 
national greenhouse gas policy in the United States, and a policy is likely to emerge 
under the Obama Administration.  Although there are proposals for a national tax on 
carbon, most proposed policies rely on a national cap and trade program for limiting and 
reducing carbon emissions.  Like a carbon tax, a cap and trade program for greenhouse 
gas emissions has the effect of inducing a price on carbon; this means that for the first 
time in the U.S. a price will be placed on each ton of CO2 emitted.  That price per unit of 
carbon emitted will ultimately be paid by consumers, shareholders, and workers.  How 
these costs are distributed among these groups and among income classes is a great 
concern to policymakers and the general public.
2   
Companies facing regulations on greenhouse gas emissions take costly steps to 
reduce their emissions levels, but the burden is ultimately borne by consumers, workers, 
or shareholders in the firm.
3  The costs of compliance are passed on through changes in 
consumer prices, stock returns, wages, and other returns to factors of production. While 
an emissions reduction can be achieved in many ways, each method has different costs 
and consequences.  In the case of an emissions tax, there is an additional cost associated 
with the payment of the tax.  Of course, this is not a net cost to society since the cost of a 
tax payment is exactly equal to the gain to the government.  If a permit is initially 
                                                 
2 In addition to the distribution across income groups, there may be variation in the spatial distribution of 
costs and benefits (Burtraw, Sweeney, and Walls, 2008).   
3 This is true regardless of statutory incidence; that is, the costs of reducing emissions are ultimately passed 
on, regardless of the point of compliance.   2 
auctioned by the government, the same transfer occurs.
4  There may, in addition, be 
additional costs or inefficiencies generated by the interaction of the tax or permit 
payment with other taxes, such as an income tax (Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw, 1997).   
In this paper we use 2003 consumption data, emissions factors and 1997 data on 
the structure of the US economy to calculate how a price on carbon is ultimately 
distributed across income groups.  Our estimates are admittedly first order; we assume all 
costs are passed on to consumers, and workers and capital owners bear none of the costs.  
Furthermore, we only calculate the direct burden of the price on carbon, not taking into 
account consumer and firm response to a higher carbon price in terms of reductions in 
carbon emissions.  Finally, we do not examine the incidence of the benefit of a price on 
carbon, in terms of the benefits of a marginal reduction in climate change. 
Our aim is to obtain a first-order estimate of the extent to which a price on carbon 
is progressive or regressive by examining consumption patterns and associated emissions 
for different parts of the income distribution.  In what follows, we focus on a carbon tax, 
noting that a fully-auctioned emissions trading program (with a correctly chosen quota) 
would generate the same results, albeit through a different mechanism.   
Without loss of generality, we analyze the effect of a carbon tax; the 
consequences of a carbon price induced by a fully-auctioned cap and trade system should 
be identical.  Our results suggest that the burden as a percent of annual income is much 
higher among lower income groups than higher income groups.  This policy is less 
regressive when considering the burden as a percentage of lifetime income, proxied by 
current expenditures (Poterba, 1989).  However, when accounting for systematic 
                                                 
4 In the case of a grandfathered cap-and-trade program, scarcity rents are created, which can actually 
benefit shareholders.  The distributional impact of a cap-and-trade program depends critically on the 
allocation method (i.e. auctioning vs. grandfathering).  See Parry, 2004. 3 
differences in household sizes across income groups using equivalence scales
5 (see, for 
example, Citro and Michael, 1995), we find that a price on carbon is even more 
regressive. We then suggest ways in which the regressive nature of a carbon tax may be 
ameliorated by pairing it with a reduction in other taxes. 
We are not the first to study the incidence of a price on carbon, and previous 
studies have generally found that carbon taxes and tradable emissions permits are 
regressive.  Metcalf (1999) studies the incidence of green tax reforms, including a carbon 
tax.  Using household-level Consumer Expenditure Survey data and input-output 
accounts, he finds that a carbon tax is regressive, but targeted tax cuts can make the 
policy distributionally neutral.  Parry (2004) uses an analytical model to show that a cap-
and-trade program for carbon emissions is regressive.  Furthermore, he argues that even 
if the poor do not have large budget shares for carbon-intensive goods a cap-and-trade 
program with grandfathered permits can be quite regressive.  In a recent paper, Hassett, 
Mathur, and Metcalf (2009) show that it is fuel and electricity use that drives the 
regressivity of a carbon tax.   
Our study differs from previous literature in several ways. First, we illustrate how 
consumption differences across income groups is the main driver behind the regressivity 
of the policy.  Second, in addition to providing household-level consumption and 
incidence estimates, we show that using equivalence scales and per-capita emissions 
leads to higher calculated levels of regressivity.  Finally, we show how the degree of 
regressivity varies with the breadth of the tax as well as the measure of income used in 
                                                 
5 Because there are economies of scale in household consumption, household-level analysis may understate 
the regressivity because wealthier households are larger, on average, than poorer ones. For example, a 
household with three people does not need three times as much space and electricity as a household with 
one person.  Equivalence scales attempt to account for the nonlinear relationship between household size 
and needs.  This methodology is discussed in greater detail in section III.    4 
the calculations (Hassett, Mathur, and Metcalf, 2009).  We calculate the incidence of a 
broad CO2 price, a price on CO2 for direct energy consumption, and price on all 
greenhouse gas emissions (CO2-equivalent). 
II.  Consumption and Emissions Data 
The economic incidence of a tax refers to how the ultimate net costs are 
distributed in an economy, usually referring to how different income groups are 
impacted.  The distribution of costs and benefits determines the winners and losers from 
environmental policy.  A progressive policy places a larger burden, as a percentage of 
wealth or income, on richer households, while a regressive policy places larger 
percentage burdens on poorer groups.  Fullerton (2009) discusses six ways environmental 
policies may have distributional impacts; forward cost-shifting is one of the major drivers 
of the incidence of environmental policy.   
To completely capture the incidence of a price on carbon, we would want to take 
into account carbon-reducing abatement activities or behavioral changes in examining the 
extent to which consumers or factors of production bear the cost of the tax.
6  We would 
also want to estimate the incidence of those abatement activities and how the government 
uses or refunds the revenues from the taxes or permits.  A general equilibrium analysis of 
the issue would also take into account the changes in relative prices in the economy 
induced by the tax or costly permits. 
A much more modest approach would fix economic activities at their current level 
and apply a price of carbon, assuming that there is no behavioral or secondary price 
response in the economy—the carbon price is passed through in its entirety to consumers 
                                                 
6 Metcalf, et al (2008) use a calibrated model to estimate the incidence of alternative greenhouse gas 
policies under various assumptions about forward and backward shifting.  Their results depend on various 
factors, including the breadth of the tax, whether other countries act, and short- vs. long-run effects. 5 
and consumers do not adjust behavior.  Such an analysis will overstate the burden on 
consumers since in actuality factors of production will bear some of the cost and, further, 
a higher price of carbon will induce actions to reduce carbon consumption and thus the 
household’s burden.  Our results would be most valid if commodity demands were 
inelastic, or if all industries use the same ratio of inputs, because this would not lead to 
changes in relative factor demands and prices.       
In our analysis, we examine the effects of a price of $15 per ton of carbon 
dioxide, equivalent to approximately $55 per ton of carbon.
7  Although there is a great 
deal of uncertainty regarding what price of carbon may emerge from the current policy 
debate in the US, this figure is in the range of the current proposals before Congress (e.g. 
Paltsev et al, 2007).  It should also be noted that, in our analysis, the relative burdens 
across income groups are independent of our choice of a price. 
We begin with data from the 2003 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The CES provides annual consumption patterns for 
households in each income quintile in the U.S. for a variety of products and services.  For 
each income group, we can then calculate the average household-level expenditure for 
shelter, electricity, gasoline, vehicles, food, clothing, insurance, and a host of other goods 
and services.  A breakdown of the per-capita expenditures of some of the goods and 
services is shown in Table 1.  For example, according to the CES, an average household 
in the lowest income quintile spent roughly $527 in 2003 on gasoline and motor oil, 
which was about 4.8% of their net annual income, whereas the corresponding percentage 
                                                 
7 The conversion between CO2-equivalent and Carbon-equivalent follows from the ratio of the atomic mass 
of a carbon dioxide molecule to the atomic mass of a carbon atom (44:12). Therefore, a $15 tax per ton of 
carbon dioxide is equivalent to a tax on carbon of $55 per ton. 6 
for a household in the wealthiest quintile is only 1.7%.   
 
Table 1: Selected Average Household Expenditures by Income Quintile (2003) 
  Quintile 1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5 
Mean Household Income 
        After Tax 
$10,879  $19,982  $34,007  $54,546    $110,878 







$77,670  > $77,671 
Mean Number 
      Persons/Household  1.8  2.3  2.6  2.9  3.1 
Mean Household Expenditures: 
Food & Alcohol  2,708  3,534  4,635  5,943   8,172 
Shelter  4,613  8,570  14,049  17,800   35,486 
Natural Gas  259  258  308  409   567 
Electricity  620  761  912  1,031   1,306 
Fuel Oil & Other Fuel  60  71  92  85   151 
Telephone Services  506  635  833  1,020   1,342 
Water & Other Public Services  177  223  295  362   495 
Household Operations, Supplies, 
Furnishings, Equipment & 
Apparel 
1,440  2,076  2,907  4,223   7,648 
Transportation & Vehicle Exp.  1,823  3,306  5,020  7,874   10,955 
Gasoline & Motor Oil  527  861  1,223  1,574   1,940 
Healthcare  1,500  1,723  2,176  2,388   3,264 
Other Expenditures  1,597  2,609  4,230  6,196   10,940 
Total Household Expenditures  15,829  24,626  36,679  48,905   82,266 
Source:  Consumer Expenditure Survey (2003).  The households with the lowest income levels (<$7,500) 
are dropped from the lowest quintile for reasons described in the text.  Figures are annual household 
expenditures in 2003 dollars. The less emissions-intensive consumption categories were aggregated here 
for exposition only; all subcategories were used in the estimates produced in this paper.   
 
Income measurement in the low end of the distribution is poor in the CES, as 
students, retirees, and transitionally unemployed people are included in this category.  As 
a result, the households with the lowest income in the CES have, on average, an 
extremely high expenditure to income ratio. Therefore we do not include households with 
income less than $7,500 in our analysis.
8 Including these households leads to a more 
regressive calculation of the incidence of a price on carbon emissions. 
                                                 
8 $7,500 corresponds to around the 5.8
th percentile.  To be consistent with other studies using these data, as 
well as studies of the incidence of other taxes, we do not alter our definitions of income quintiles to account 
for dropping these households.   7 
To estimate the consumption consequences of a carbon price, we need to look at 
how that price would ripple through the economy, ultimately being borne by the 
consumer.  For instance, food production requires fuel to run tractors (with associated 
carbon emissions), but it also requires fertilizer, for which carbon was emitted during its 
production.  This suggests the use of an input-output approach. 
The standard input-output tables for the US, produced by the US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA), divide the economy into a large number of industrial sectors.  
The IO table for a particular year indicates for each sector j, how much was purchased 
from each of the other sectors i=1,2,…,n to produce $1 of output for sector j.  It is thus a 
straightforward calculation to translate a vector of final demands in these industrial 
categories into total production in each of the categories, satisfying both final demand 
and intermediate demand.  This same technique can be used to calculate how a tax on 
direct carbon emissions in each sector will ripple through the economy to increase the 
price of final consumption for the sector, assuming no steps are taken to substitute away 
from carbon intensive goods. 
More formally, let A be a n x n input-output matrix, where the coefficients aij 
represent the inputs (in $) from sector j necessary to produce $1 worth of output for 
sector i.  Let c be a vector of final demands for goods in each industry (in dollars), and let 
x be a vector of total output (in dollars) for the various sectors of the economy.  Leontief 
(for example, 1986) formulated this input-output model such that  
  x c Ax = + ⇔ c A I x
1 ) (
− − =  (1)     
where I is the identity matrix.
9   
                                                 
9 We assumethat (I-A) is regular so that it is invertible; in practice, this assumption generally holds true. 8 
A straightforward extension of this traditional input output model is to calculate 
the emissions necessary for production of final consumption goods, accounting for 
emissions of all primary and intermediate processes necessary to produce final goods 
(Leontief, 1970; Hendrickson, et al, 2006).  Let g be a vector with the j
th element equal to 
the greenhouse gas emissions (in CO2-equivalent) per $1 of output for that sector.  For a 
consumption vector c, the resulting total emissions e (a scalar) are then given by  
  c A I g x g e
1 ) (
− − ′ = ′ = . (2) 
This method essentially traces emissions through an economy and provides us 
with estimates of emissions attributable to the consumption of final goods.  Now if a tax 
of τ dollars per ton emissions of CO2-equivalent were levied, the total tax paid, associated 
with a consumption vector c, would be τe.   
The input-output matrix for the US is regularly compiled and published by the 
BEA.  The vector of emissions factors, g, is not as readily available, though can be 
estimated from available data.  Researchers at Carnegie-Mellon University (Hendrickson 
et al., 2006) have estimated these emissions factors and developed an easily used version 
of the 1997 US input output tables to allow the tracing of greenhouse gas emissions 
throughout the economy.
10   
Using the Carnegie Mellon version of the US input-output model (the “CMU 
Model”), we obtain the amount of emissions (both CO2 and all emissions in terms of 
CO2-equivalent) associated with each of the 491 sectors of input-output accounts.
11  
                                                 
10 The CMU model  (the Economic Input Output Life Cycle Assessment (EIO LCA) model) is available 
online at http://www.eiolca.net/about.html. 
11 Because consumption data were from (2003), we adjusted expenditures using the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) to make prices compatible with 1997 conditions.  Because energy prices have increased more than 
the average price levels, we apply specific deflators for consumption category.  This was only to done to 
get emissions factors for consumption goods; all consumption figures are in 2003 dollars. 9 
Table 2 shows the top 20 sectors in terms of CO2 emissions. Assuming a $15 carbon price 
in 2009, the final column shows the percent cost increase for that sector implied by the 
model. For $1 million in purchases, the top emitting sector is lime manufacturing, which 
is responsible for 9,840 MT CO2. The second-highest emitter is sector 221100, Power 
Generation and Supply, emitting 7,455 MT CO2.  Considering the large number of 
sectors in the economy, there are remarkably few sectors that see substantial cost 
increases (though what constitutes substantial is a subjective judgment).   What is 
relevant to these specific industries is who ultimately bears the burden: consumers, 
workers or owners.  
Then, using data from the BEA, we match sectors of the IO model to the Personal 
Consumption Expenditure (PCE) categories, which are then comparable to the categories 
in the CES version developed by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
and which are used in the analysis.
12   
In practice, for any product category, the CMU model tells us how many tons of 
greenhouse gases are emitted to create $1 Million worth of output.  Because the process 
is linear, we can then calculate the number of tons of CO2 and total greenhouse gases (in 
terms of CO2-equivalent) that were emitted so that an average consumer in each income 
quintile could purchase his or her bundle of goods and services.
13  It is then a 
                                                 
12 The NBER CES extracts, available online, are condensed to 109 categories (including income sources) of 
the CES.  This allows the categories to be more comparable to the PCE categories. 
13 Emissions resulting from combustion in motor vehicles and the use of natural gas are not included in the 
CMU Model, as the model only calculates the greenhouse gases associated with the production and 
distribution of these goods.  We add the emissions from using gasoline and natural gas using the standard 
EPA estimates, imputed by using the average price for these fuels in 2006 to determine the amount 
purchased.  There is evidence that poorer households drive older, less fuel-efficient cars, which would 
imply that emissions per gallon of gasoline for these income groups could actually be higher (West and 
Williams, 2004).  We assume that each income quintile has similar driving habits and vehicles, though 
differences across income groups would lead to slightly different incidence estimates.  In this case, it would 10 
straightforward calculation to determine how much the average consumer in each income 
quintile would pay for a given price on carbon induced by a tax or permit price.  
Table 2: Sector-Level Emissions  
Note:  Emissions estimates from Carnegie Mellon University Green Design Institute’s 
EIO-LCA model.  Emissions include direct and indirect emissions attributable to $1 
Million in sales (2009 dollars) from that sector.  The cost increase is computed assuming 
a $15 price on CO2 emissions.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
increase the regressivity, though accounting for behavioral responses by income group would lead to a 
greater decrease in quantity demanded for low-income groups, which would have an offsetting effect.   
 Sector  Sector  Description   CO2 Emissions 
(MT) 




1 327410    Lime  manufacturing  9,840 10,064 14.8%
2 221100   Power generation and 
supply 7,455 7,827 11.2%
3 327310    Cement  manufacturing  5,554 5,680 8.3%
4 325311   Nitrogenous fertilizer 
manufacturing 4,435 9,393 6.7%
5 325312   Phosphatic fertilizer 
manufacturing 3,660 4,197 5.5%
6 S00202   State and local government 
electric utilities  3,191 3,429 4.8%
7 324191   Petroleum lubricating oil 
and grease manufacturing  2,751 2,982 4.1%
8 325120   Industrial gas 
manufacturing 2,676 7,134 4.0%
9 331312   Primary aluminum 
production 2,639 4,249 4.0%
10 325221   Cellulosic organic fiber 
manufacturing 2,460 2,579 3.7%
11  331311   Alumina refining  2,385 2,587 3.6%
12 331112   Ferroalloy and related 
product manufacturing  2,296 2,475 3.4%
13 325130   Synthetic dye and pigment 
manufacturing 2,154 2,266 3.2%
14  212210   Iron ore mining  2,050 2,199 3.1%
15 212390   Other nonmetallic mineral 
mining 1,901 2,013 2.9%
16  331111   Iron and steel mills  1,811 2,050 2.7%
17  311221   Wet corn milling  1,774 3,362 2.7%
18  486000   Pipeline transportation  1,565 2,989 2.3%
19  484000   Truck transportation  1,498 1,580 2.2%
20 325314   Fertilizer, mixing only, 
manufacturing 1,498 2,348 2.2%11 
Using this method implies an aggregate level of US greenhouse gas emissions in 
2003 to be about 5,298 Tg CO2, compared to the EPA’s greenhouse gas inventory 
estimate of 5,953 Tg CO2 (US EPA, 2007).
14  Similarly, we calculate the total greenhouse 
gas emissions for 2003 to be 6,582 Tg CO2-equivalent, compared to 7,104 Tg CO2-
equivalent from the EPA. Considering that the CMU model is calibrated to the 1997 
economy, our implied emissions calculation for 2003 is remarkably close to observed 
data.  On a per-capita basis, this implies an ‘average’ consumer’s emissions of about 18.2 
metric tons of CO2,
15 compared to estimates of 20.5 by the EPA. 
Table 3: Estimated Annual CO2 Emissions by Income Quintile 
  Quintile 1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5 









$77,670  > $77,671 
Mean (After Tax) Income   $10,879   $19,982   $34,007   $54,546   $110,878 
Mean Household Size  1.8 2.3 2.6 2.9  3.1 
Mean Household Emissions 
Food & Alcohol           2.19           2.83           3.69            4.67            6.28 
Shelter          1.87           3.68           6.04           7.32          14.74 
Natural Gas         1.99           1.97           2.35          3.13           4.34 
Electricity  7.26  8.91  10.68  12.08   15.30 
Fuel Oil & Other Fuel  0.68  0.81  1.05  0.96   1.71 
Telephone Services  0.06  0.07  0.09  0.11   0.15 
Water & Other Public Services  0.17  0.21  0.28  0.34   0.47 
Household Operations, Supplies, 
Furnishings, Equipment & 
Apparel 
0.61  0.90  1.31  1.87   3.40 
Transportation & Vehicle 
Expense  0.44  0.96  1.58  2.53   3.39 
Gasoline & Motor Oil  4.99  8.15  11.59  14.92   18.38 
Healthcare  0.29  0.33  0.42  0.42   0.62 
Other Expenditures  1.16  1.66  2.38  3.65   7.21 
Total Emissions  21.70  30.49  41.45  51.98   75.99 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using Consumer Expenditure Survey (2003) data and the CMU model 
described above.  Figures are in metric tons of CO2.   
 
                                                 
14 Tg stands for teragram and is equal to 10
12 grams which is a million metric tons. 
15 This is based on a July, 2003 U.S. Census population estimate. 12 
The total household emissions were calculated for each  household’s consumption 
bundle by simply adding the emissions for each product in the bundle for that year.  
Annual average emissions estimates are shown for households in each income quintile in 
Table 3.  As shown in the table, the households from the poorest income quintile 
consumed goods and services associated with 21.7 metric tons of CO2  in 2003, while the 
average household in the top quintile was responsible for about emissions of 76 tons of 
CO2.  Similarly, Table 4 shows the breakdown of CO2-equivalent emissions by income 
group.   
Table 4: Estimated Household Annual CO2-Equiv. Emissions by Income Quintile 
  Quintile 1  Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Quintile 5 
Household Income Range  







$77,670  > $77,671 
Mean Per-Capita (After Tax) 
Income  $10,879  $19,982  $34,007  $54,546   $110,878 
Mean Household Size  1.8 2.3 2.6 2.9  3.1 
Mean Household Emissions 
Food & Alcohol  4.64  5.92  7.67  9.55   12.56 
Shelter  2.22  4.37  7.17  8.68   17.46 
Natural Gas  2.43  2.42  2.88  3.83   5.32 
Electricity  7.62  9.36  11.22  12.69   16.06 
Fuel Oil & Other Fuel  0.75  0.90  1.17  1.07   1.91 
Telephone Services  0.06  0.08  0.11  0.13   0.17 
Water & Other Public Services  1.16  1.45  1.92  2.36   3.23 
Household Operations, Supplies, 
Furnishings, Equipment & 
Apparel 
0.76  0.93  1.37  1.84  3.29 
Transportation & Vehicle 
Expense  0.53  1.13  1.86  2.99  4.01 
Gasoline & Motor Oil  5.73  9.36  13.30  17.12   21.11 
Healthcare  0.36  0.41  0.52  0.52   0.77 
Other Expenditures  1.21  1.93  2.74  4.17   8.09 
Total Emissions  27.47  38.26  51.92  64.95   93.96 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using Consumer Expenditure Survey (2003) data and the CMU model 
described above.  Figures are in metric tons of CO2-equivalent.   
 13 
As shown in Tables 3 and 4, the most carbon-relevant sectors are fossil-fuel 
intensive; gasoline, electricity, natural gas and food are the goods purchased by 
consumers with the highest associated emissions.  In the next section we use these figures 
to calculate the incidence of a price on carbon. 
 
III.    The Incidence of a Price on Carbon 
 
Using emissions calculations from the previous section, we calculate the burden 
of a price on carbon emissions for each household in the CES.  For a tax of $15 per ton 
CO2 (based on the emissions estimates in Table 3),
 an average household in the lowest 
income quintile would pay around $325 per year, while an average household in the 
wealthiest quintile would pay $1,140 annually.  Although wealthier households would 
pay more in absolute terms, as a percentage of annual income, lower income groups bear 
a disproportionate share of the burden.  The poorest quintile’s burden (as a share of 
annual income) is 3.2 times that of the wealthiest quintile’s.  The burden as a share of 
annual income for the lowest income group ($7,500-9,999) is almost four times higher 
than the burden-to-income ratio for the highest income group in the data ($200,000-
250,000).  This is seen graphically in Figure 1, where the percentage of household 
expenditures on a price on carbon is plotted against income groups.   
There is a debate among economists as to whether current income or lifetime 
income should be used in the calculation of the incidence of a policy.  Because annual 
income is volatile, and because it tends to increase and then decrease with age, a person’s 
annual income may not be a good proxy for their relative income over their lifetime. 14 
However, lifetime income is far more difficult to measure.
16  Current expenditures can be 
used as a proxy for lifetime income if consumption is relatively smooth over a person’s 
lifespan (Poterba, 1989; Metcalf, 1999).
17  In this case, calculating the burden as a 
percent of lifetime income rather than current income results in a less regressive policy, 
though some authors find that using current expenditures as a proxy for lifetime income 
exaggerates the decrease in regressivity (Caspersen and Metcalf, 1994).  When 
comparing the burden as a percentage of annual expenditures, a person’s burden in the 
lowest income quintile is about 1.4 times that of the highest quintile.   
 
Figure 1.  Broad CO2 Tax Burden by Household Income Group  
 
                                                 
16 The data used here make measuring lifetime income impossible, so a proxy is used.  Fullerton and 
Rogers (1993) measure lifetime income and classify households accordingly.  They find that the bias in 
regressivity based on annual income is not as severe as suggested by previous researchers.  
17 According to the lifetime income hypothesis, consumption is relatively smooth across time because 
people make contemporaneous consumption decisions based on their lifetime (and not current) income.  
For example, students may take out loans to support themselves during college because they anticipate 
earning income after graduating, and workers forgo consumption and save so that they have money for 
retirement.   15 
CO2 price ($15/ton) as a percent of annual net income and current expenditures.  Equivalent income 
measures are described in the text.  Authors’ calculations  using consumption data from the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey and associated emissions from the Economic Input Output model from Carnegie 
Mellon University.    
 
There is a systematic difference in average household size across income groups, 
which can be seen in the CES summary statistics in Table 1.  Households in the lowest 
income quintile have an average of 1.8 persons, whereas households in the top quintile 
have, on average, 3.1 persons.  Since wealthy households are larger, on average, this 
inflates the relative income of the poorer households (Cutler and Katz, 1992). Thus, using 
household level data for emissions and income may lead to a lower estimate of 
regressivity than if one accounts for these differences.  Therefore, in addition to 
household income (annual and lifetime), we use equivalence scales to calculate the 
incidence of a carbon price. Equivalence scales have been used widely (e.g. Cutler and 
Katz, 1992; Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger, 2007), and are meant to account for 
economies of scale in household consumption.  We parameterize equivalent persons, E, 
as 
5 . ) 4 . ( K A E + = , where A is the number of adults, and K is the number of children.  For 
households with at least two people, we assume that the first two people are adults and 
the others are children.  However, if the number of income-earners in the household 
exceeds two, we set A equal to the number of income earners.
18  For each household, we 
then calculate the per-capita burden of a price on carbon as a percent of household 
income scaled by E.    
For a price on all CO2 emissions, the use of equivalent annual income leads to a 
more regressive calculation than household-level annual income.  The per-capita burden-
                                                 
18 We also used alternative methods to proxy for the number of adults in a household, as well as other 
equivalence scales.  The incidence calculations vary slightly with the choice of equivalence scales, but the 
results with alternative equivalence scales are much more regressive than household-level analysis. 16 
to-equivalent-income ratio for the lowest income group (between $7,500 and $9,999) is 
nearly 7 times greater than for the highest income group (between $200,000 and 
$250,000).  On an equivalent lifetime income basis, the ratio is about 3.5 times higher for 
the lowest income group.   
We then considered a price on all greenhouse gas emissions (in terms of CO2-
equivalent.  Figure 2 shows the calculations by income group using the four measures of 
income.  Again, the policy is regressive using all measures.  Using annual income, the 
ratio for the lowest income group is over four times higher than the highest income 
group, but on a lifetime basis it is only twice as high.  Using equivalent income, the per-
capita burdens are about 7.25 times higher on an annual basis for the lowest income 
group than the highest.  And on an equivalent lifetime income basis (i.e. equivalent 
expenditures), the ratio is about 3.6 times higher. 
 
Figure 2.  Broad CO2-Equivalent Tax Burden by Income (%) 
 17 
Tax on CO2 ($15/ton) equivalent as a percent of annual net income and current expenditures.  Equivalent 
income measures are described in the text.  Authors’ calculations  using consumption data from the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey and associated emissions from the Economic Input Output model from 




 Finally,  we  consider a price on CO2 emissions only on consumption of energy 
goods.  The distribution of the burden on consumers from a higher price on gasoline, 
electricity, natural gas and fuel oil is shown in Figure 3.  Using household annual income, 
the ratio for the lowest income group is almost 8 times higher than the highest income 
group, and on a lifetime income basis (using expenditures) we calculate that the ratio is 
about 2.9 times higher.  Using equivalent annual income, the per-capita burden is almost 
fifteen times higher, and using equivalent lifetime income the per-capita burden is over 
five times higher.  Similar to the findings in Hassett, Mathur, and Metcalf (2009), it 
appears that the regressivity of the policy is driven largely by direct energy consumption.   
 
 
Figure 3.  CO2 Tax Only on Consumption of Energy Goods  
 18 
CO2 price ($15/ton) as a percent of annual net income and current expenditures.  Equivalent income 
measures are described in the text.  Authors’ calculations  using consumption data from the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey and associated emissions from the Economic Input Output model from Carnegie 
Mellon University.    
 
A price on carbon, given the assumptions above, would be regressive, but the 
degree of regressivity depends on the income measure used.  On an annual basis, a 
carbon price is 2-3 times more regressive than on a lifetime basis (i.e. using annual 
expenditures).  When examining the policy on a per-capita basis with equivalence scales, 
a carbon price is roughly twice as regressive than at the household level.  In each case the 
regressivity is largely driven by direct energy consumption.  This finding is consistent 
with other studies of the household incidence of carbon emission policies.
19  Furthermore, 
as discussed briefly in the next section, the overall regressivity of a policy depends 
critically on how the revenues are used.   
IV. Policy  Implications 
The regressive nature of pollution control policies is often a concern of 
politicians, but these new revenues could be used to benefit those harmed 
disproportionately by the new policy.  Because the price on carbon discussed here would 
generate substantial revenues for the government, it is important to consider how these 
revenues might be spent so that the burden does not fall disproportionately on lower 
income groups.  As discussed elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Parry et al, 2005), a price 
on carbon could be made less regressive, or even progressive, by “recycling” the revenue 
                                                 
19 Other economic studies of carbon taxes (e.g. Metcalf, 2008; Wier et al. 2005) generally find that they are 
regressive, but the degree varies based on the methodology, assumptions, and income basis (annual vs. 
lifetime).  For example, Metcalf (2008) uses 2003 consumption data to estimate the partial equilibrium 
incidence of a carbon tax.  For a $15 carbon tax, he finds that an average consumer in the lowest income 
decile would experience a decrease in disposable income of 3.4%, whereas the wealthiest income decile’s 
disposable income would decrease by 0.8%.  Wier et al (2005) find that the poorest decile spent 0.8% of 
disposable income on the Danish carbon tax, while the wealthiest spent about 0.3% of their disposable 
income.  For a review of other policies, see Parry, et al. (2005). 19 
into tax cuts elsewhere in an economy.
20  This could be achieved by targeting income tax 
cuts at lower income groups, reducing (or even eliminating) other federal taxes, or by 
increasing spending on government programs targeted at lower income groups.  Here we 
briefly discuss these options; for a more thorough (partial equilibrium) discussion of a 
revenue-neutral carbon tax swap, see Metcalf (2008).   
To make the carbon emissions policy discussed above distributionally neutral, 
lump-sum transfers, which are essentially cash payments that do not alter incentives or 
behavior, could be used.  A more practical alternative would be in the form of reductions 
in the income tax burden for individuals based on their annual income.  In practice, the 
price on carbon here could be made distributionally neutral by directing transfers (or 
income tax credits) in the amounts of $119, $112, $105, and $76 to individuals in the first 
four income quintiles, respectively.  This would place a burden on each household of 
around 1% of net annual income (equal to the burden of the highest income group), 
offsetting the regressive effects of the price on carbon while leaving $49.6 Billion in 
government revenues. 
Alternatively, revenues from a price on carbon could be used to finance cuts in 
other taxes.
21  The study of the incidence of taxes is a major subfield of public finance, 
and many empirical (and theoretical) studies have focused on the distributional incidence 
of payroll taxes, value-added taxes
22, sales taxes, and excise taxes.  The literature 
                                                 
20 In a recent paper, Boyce and Riddle (2009) examine the state-by-state incidence of a $25 carbon 
tax/permit price, 80% of the revenues of which are rebated to consumers.   
21 To the extent that the pre-existing taxes are distortionary, under certain conditions this may even lead to 
an efficiency gain (Goulder, et al., 1997). 
22 The literature on the incidence of a value-added tax (VAT) generally finds that such a policy is 
regressive.  Caspersen and Metcalf (1994) find that a value added tax on food, housing and healthcare is 
mildly regressive, with the ratio of the median tax liability to income for the lowest income decile equal to 
2.3, and for the highest decile 1.1.  When using proxies for lifetime income, the degree of regressivity 20 
generally finds these taxes to be regressive, though the degree varies widely due to 
assumptions about income, the amount of pass-through, and other factors (Fullerton and 
Metcalf, 2002).  For example, Poterba’s (1989) study of the incidence of a gasoline tax 
finds that the bottom quintile’s burden as a percent of current income is 5.3 times as high 
as that of the highest income quintile’s.  When calculating the burden as a share of 
current expenditures, he finds that it is less regressive—about 1.5 times as high.
23   
One candidate for revenue recycling would be to use revenues to finance cuts in 
the payroll tax.
24  The costs of a payroll tax are regressive, and although part of the 
burden is paid by the employer, most studies find that the burden falls almost entirely on 
workers through reductions in wages (Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002).  The Federal 
Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax is regressive in its very nature because beyond 
the Wage Base limit (currently $102,000 per year), any additional earnings are untaxed.  
Therefore the tax, as a percentage of income, effectively declines as income increases 
beyond that level.
25  According to Chamberlain and Prante, the average effective tax rate 
for the payroll tax in 2004 was 2.75% for the lowest income quintile, 7.11% for the 
second, 9.05% for the third, 9.53% for the fourth, and 7.79% for the top quintile.  
Targeted revenue recycling from a carbon emissions policy could help create a more 
distributionally neutral payroll tax.   
                                                                                                                                                 
declines.  Because there is no federal VAT in the US, revenues from a carbon tax could not be used to 
finance reductions in the VAT. 
23 West and Williams (2004) also study the incidence of a gasoline tax, but they estimate the elasticity of 
demand for each income group and find that the tax is less regressive if one accounts for this behavioral 
response.  
24 In fact, Representative John B. Larson of Connecticut has introduced a bill (HR 3416) into the US 
Congress to tax carbon but to couple this with a revenue neutral reduction in the payroll tax.  His proposal 
involves the carbon tax starting small and gradually increasing over time.  
25 However, a Congressional Budget Office study (CBO, 2006) argues that the overall social security 
system is progressive once benefits are factored in.  On the other hand, Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass 
(2000) show that the progressivity of social security depends critically on the methodology of calculation.  
When incorporating mortality probabilities that differ by potential lifetime income, they find that social 
security, overall, is no longer progressive; for a discount rate of 4%, it is even regressive. 21 
In order to fully analyze how to finance cuts in pre-existing taxes to create a 
distributionally neutral (or even progressive) bundle of taxes, we would need to analyze 
the general equilibrium effects of the overall tax system.  However, a back-of-the-
envelope estimate using the figures from the prior section suggests that the total annual 
revenues from a price on carbon of $15 per ton would equal approximately $79.2 Billion.  
Although this is most likely an upper bound on actual revenues, because of reasons 
discussed above, a price on carbon could yield substantial government revenues, and 
careful recycling of these revenues could offset the regressive nature of a national GHG 
emissions policy.   
 
V.  Conclusions 
We use the Consumer Expenditure Survey and an augmented input-output model 
of the US economy to illustrate the regressive nature of a price on carbon in the United 
States.  We show that the costs of a price on borne by consumers are regressive by nature 
because polluting goods are mostly energy-intensive and take up a large percentage of a 
low-income person’s budget.  The degree of regressivity varies with the breadth of the 
policy.  The incidence of a carbon price applied only to final energy consumption is 
nearly twice as regressive as a price applied to all CO2 emissions.  Furthermore, taking 
into account differences in household size across income groups and equivalence scales, 
the per-capita incidence suggests a much more regressive policy than calculations at the 
household level.   
We find that the costs of a greenhouse gas policy in the United States are 
regressive, but there are a few caveats that deserve some attention.  The direct burden is 22 
only one channel through which a climate policy has distributional effects, and as 
discussed earlier, there are other factors that determine the overall incidence of a carbon 
tax or emissions trading system (Fullerton, 2009).  For example, we do not consider the 
distribution of the benefits of a greenhouse gas policy.  If low income groups have more 
to gain from a cap-and-trade program or a carbon tax, the ‘net’ incidence of the policy 
may actually be progressive; alternatively, if wealthier households have more to gain, the 
‘net’ incidence may be even more regressive. 
There are several other caveats from our analysis. First, producers were assumed 
not to change production choices, costs were assumed to be fully passed through to 
consumers, and consumers are assumed to be unresponsive to increased product prices.  
Other researchers have found that low-income consumers are more responsive to price 
increases of polluting goods such as gasoline (West and Williams, 2004).  Depending on 
the price elasticity of demand for other energy-intensive products, this could reduce the 
regressivity of a price on carbon.  Second, some of the costs may be borne by factors of 
production (Fullerton and Heutel, 2007).  Environmental regulations may change real 
wages and returns to capital, which would change the optimal production inputs (and 
hence emissions) for various sectors, and the distribution of these costs across income 
groups affects the overall incidence of a price on carbon.  Third, while we consider a 
broad price on carbon that takes into account all emissions, in practice a carbon tax or 
emissions trading system may have exemptions for emissions from some industries due 
to political considerations or high monitoring costs.   
The regressive nature of the costs of a price on carbon could be alleviated (or 
eliminated) by carefully recycling revenues.  This could be done by targeted transfers, 23 
financing cuts in regressive payroll or excise taxes, targeting income tax cuts at lower 
income groups, or by increasing spending on government programs targeted at lower 
income groups.   
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